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The Intergenerational Invisible Hand: 
A Comment on Sartorius's "Government 
Regulation and Intergenerational Justice" 
by Arthur M. Diamond, Jr. 
Depamn t  of Economics 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
In "Government Regulation and Intergenerational Justice," Rolf Sartorius argues 
that some government regulation is justitied in order to pmtect the rights of the 
unborn.' More than half of his paper is a discussion of the theory that views the 
only justifiable function of government as the "umpirage of the law of nature." 
In the remainder of his paper, he argues for an extension of the theory in order 
to justify regulation as weU as umpirage. In particular, he argues that protecting 
the rights of the unborn represents an especially strong case where government 
regulation is justified. 
Sartorius's central argument is that everyone has a right to certain basic goods 
that are the prerequisites of leading a human life. Some of these goods are "public 
goods," the future provision of which is not assured in a hee market regime. Since 
future generations have rights to these public goods, it is the duty of the current 
generation, thmugh government regulation, to protect them. 
Sartorius's position has a Rawlsian flavor to it,l which is not surprising until 
it is remembered that he claims his position to be a natural extension of standard 
libertarian theory. The paradox is only an apparent one, however, because Sar- 
torius believes that the classical libettarian theorist John Locke was a closet Rawlsm. 
According to Sartorius @. 184). a variant of the Rawlsian difference principle (that 
inequality is justified only if the position of the worst off is thereby improved) 
lies at the root of Locke's justification of initial property acquisition (the socalled 
Lockean Proviso). That is, when a certain quality of land is scarce, its initial 
acquisition can be justitied only if those who do not acquire the land are made 
better off. 
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It would be easy to dispute Sartorius's introduction of the Rawlsian difference 
principle into libertarian theory. For instance, many libertarians argue that Locke 
was wrong to t h i i  that before there was private pmperty, pmperty was held in 
common. These libertarians believe that if someone acquires something that was 
previously unowned, no one is thereby "barred," even if there is not enough left 
for everyone else. Even the libertarian who believes that property was fust held 
in common need not accept the difference principle. He might ask why the worst- 
off person is the one who must be made belter off. Why not require that the average 
person be made better off or, through some chance device, that everyone have 
the opportunity to be made much beaer oft? Plausible arguments can be made for 
each of these proposals, but I will not make them here. 
In order to move on to issues that are either more interesting or easier to resolve, 
I wiU accept the introduction of the difference principle into libertarian theory and 
will focus on two other claims that are central to Sartorius's argument: The first 
is the claim that the unborn have rights; the second is the claim that under an 
unregulated system, important public goods would be disastrously depleted. 
On the fmt issue, I deny Sartorius's briefly asserted clam that it is proper to 
attribute rights to the unborn. The problem is that attributing rights to the unborn 
is inconsistent with the view that the source of rights is the autonomy of the individual 
human beiig. A necessary condition for the exercise of any rights is that the agent 
exist. The never-existent cannot have rights. So if the unborn has any right, it has 
the right to be born. But then it follows that potential parents do not have the right 
to interfere with the birth of the unborn. Contraception would be immoral, and 
abortion even more strongly so. Such a view of the rights of the unborn might 
be defensible, perhaps from a religious perspective. But surely it is not consistent 
with the view, partially endorsed by Sartorius @. 180), that the source of rights 
is the capacity of adults to lead autonomous lives. 
The unborn do have a right to basic goods once they are born, but the clams 
are against their parents, not against society. Even if Sartorius is right about the 
difference principle, still the principle applies only to the frst generation. In that 
generation when property is acquired, everyone has a claim to basic goods. If, 
afterwards, some dissipate what they have, whether thmugh laziness, risk-taking 
or some other choice, then they have no claim on the rest of society. If the dissipated 
choose to have children, then it is the parents who have an obligation to provide 
the children with the basic goods. In such cases other people might wish to offer 
help, but the government has no right to intervene. 
Even if Sartorius is correct about the rights of the unborn, to justify regulation 
he still needs to claim that in an unregulated society there would be a disastrous 
depletion of basic goods. I propose now to examine this latter claim. 
Sartorius defmes public goods in terms of externalities. He does not claim that 
the unborn have a right to all the advantages that we have-for instance he denies 
that the unborn have a right to the wilderness areas we now enjoy. Instead, he 
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limits the claims of the unborn to basic goods which understandably go unlisted 
but which must presumably be those items that are the necessary conditions for 
an autonomous life. So it is clear that for Sartorius it takes more than some alleged 
inefficiency to justify regulation. In the paradigmatic public goods case of "over- 
grazing," for example, the fact that the commons support a few less cattle than 
the land might support under another system is not e n o ~ g h . ~  It would have to 
be shown that the "overgrazing" deprives future generations of basic goods. 
The cases where regulation would be justified according to Sartorius (p. 193) 
are those where there is a threshold beyond which the public good will be 
destroyed. Sartorius uses as an example a situation in which people hunt a 
particular animal in such numbers that the species is reduced to the point where 
it can no longer reproduce itself. The scenario sounds plausible because there 
are species that have become extinct in just this way. I remember my great- 
grandmother telling me how the skies in Southern Indiana used to be filled with 
passenger pigeons, and I also remember her telling me how good passenger pigeon 
pie tasted. In all actual cases, however, it should be observed that the extinct 
species was not a basic good. People were able to lead meaningful lives after 
the passing of the passenger pigeon, just as they would be able to lead mean- 
ingful lives if the snail darter were to become extinct. The soundness of Sartorius's 
argument, then, depends not on whether a species has ever become extinct, but 
rather on whether under a market system a disaster threshold would ever be passed 
for something that was really a basic good. 
My answer is a strong no-the disaster threshold would never be reached under 
an unregulated free market system. 
The main area of Sartorius's concern appeats to be the environment. Those 
who predict environmental disaster commit the common fallacy of prediction by 
extrapolation. In some situations extrapolation is the best we can do, but in others, 
and fortunately this is one of them, economics has provided us with better tools 
of analysis. 
My argument is relatively simple. As some limited good is consumed, the price 
rises. As the price rises, consumption declines, production of substitutes increases, 
conservation (or "hoarding") of the good increases, and research into new 
technology increases. Thus, disaster is always averted through the incentives pro- 
vided by the price mechanism. 
The immediate response to my argument might be that it is irrelevant to Sar- 
torius's position, since he is considering just those cases where the goods are 
not privately owned and hence where the incentives of the price system cannot 
operate. Such a response would be mistaken, for the same sort of argument can 
be applied in the Sartorius case of a public good that is also a basic good. If the 
public good has no adequate substitutes (as must be the case in the depletion of 
a good properly called "basic"), the value of the remaining units of the good 
would rapidly increase. At some point, the benefit of preserving the remaining 
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supply would exceed the costs of instituting private property in the good. In the 
language of economists, it would then pay to internalize the externalities. Once 
the good had become privately owned, the price mechanism would operate to 
assure that the disaster threshold would never be reached. 
The theory of the evolution of property rights that I employ is not novel. It 
has been persuasively argued for by Harold Demsetz in his classic article on the 
economics of p r~pe r ty .~  There he gives the specific example of the Indian tribe 
that used to hunt beaver without having any sort of individual territories. When 
the white man came, the demand for beaver pelts increased the value of beavers 
and led to a depletion of the supply. This in turn led to the assignment of par- 
ticular areas to particular Indians, thus providing the incentive for beaver 
conservation, 
In modern times, the depletion of a basic good could be dealt with either by 
extensions of common law property conceptions through the courts, or through 
explicit legislation. 
Sartorius does briefly consider the possibility that public goods might be made 
private. He dismisses the possibility on the basis of one counterexample. His case 
is one where a migratory herd ranges over land held in common by a group of 
people. The herd becomes depleted, so the land is divided into private parcels. 
But since the herd migrated, it still is in the interests of each individual to kill 
as many animals as he can. So the disaster threshold is reached even though there 
is private property. 
The problem with Sartorius's counterexample is that he has not really allowed 
the public good to be privately owned. The land has been made private, but the 
animah are still public goods. If property rights in the animals had been assign- 
ed, then the owner could either Fence them in and provide them with food and 
shelter during the period when they would have migrated, or he could let them 
migrate and purchase easements over the property through which his animals will 
pass. In either case, there is no reason to believe the threshold limit would be 
reached (assuming, as before, that the animals were a basic good). 
So far, I have presented a general argument for how the market will avoid 
disaster, and I have also pointed out why Sartorius's counterexample is no counter- 
example at all. My case, however, would be stronger if I had been a bit more 
specific in saying how the free market would handle specific disasters that bother 
environmentalists. 
Predicting the future is always difficult, but it is possible to suggest the general 
long-run features of an unregulated free enterprise world. First, there would be 
stable population. As income rises in developing nations, parents eventually have 
smaller families. As Becker's theory of the family puts it, with rising income, 
parents invest more in quality and less in quantity of children.' Second, there 
would be inexhaustible sources of energy. Fusion power is expected to be feasible 
by the turn of the century. The fuel source of a fusion reactor is water. Finally, 
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as exhaustible resources are used, their price would rise. The higher prices would, 
first, cause substitution in consumption toward products that do not use these 
resources; second, cause substitution in production toward renewable factors of 
production; third, make recycling more profitable; and finally, provide the 
incentive for technological advance. 
Environmentalists today see a market failure to provide for furure energy needs, 
just as past extrapolators saw failure in the exhaustion of whale oil for lighting 
and of large Canadiin trees for the masts of the British fleet.6 The environmentalists 
should not be ridiculed too severely for seeing market failure where there is none. 
Their arguments are plausible on a common-sense level as are most arguments 
of market failure. 
The invisible hand is often very diicult to see. Even those who generally defend 
the market have their favorite "market failures." One of Robert Nozick's is 
discussed in Anarchy, State, and Utopia7There, in a footnote (p. 313,  Nozick 
claims that if people were able, as they may soon be, to easily select the sex of 
their child, they would overwhelmingly choose to have boys. The resulting 
imbalance would have disastrous consequences for future generations. One 
remedy, according to Nozick, would be to have the government require hospitals 
to maintain a one-to-one ratio. In reluctantly mentioning such a remedy, Nozick 
was unaware of a survey reported in the journal Sc i en~e . ~Just as Nozick would 
predict, the survey showed that if couples were free to choose, they would over- 
whelmingly prefer their first chid to be male. But, and here is the surprise, they 
would just as ovenvhelmingly want their second child to be female. When addi- 
tional children are taken into account, the resulting sex ratio in society is one-to- 
one. In addition, allowing choice of sex would have the benefit of making it easier 
to find an appropriate mate. A male would be more likely to have a younger sister 
whose friends are of the right age for marriage, and likewise a female would 
be more likely have an older brother whose friends are of the right age. Thus 
if couples are allowed freely to choose the sex of their children, future genera- 
tions will be benefited "as if by an invisible hand." 
The moral of the story is that when the invisible hand is finally seen clearly, 
it may not be as arthritic as Sartorius believes. 
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